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1 Introduction
The famous no-hidden-variables theorems have played a crucial, though often question-
able role in the history of quantum mechanics. For decades they have been employed to
defend the quantum orthodoxy and to argue, nay prove, that any attempt to go beyond
the statistical formalism of standard quantum mechanics in providing a “complete” de-
scription of the microcosm is bound to fail. Even after David Bohm (1952) got “the
impossible done” (as Bell (2004, p. 160) later put it) and showed how the statistical
predictions of quantum mechanics can be derived from an ontology of point particles and
a deterministic law of motion, many scientists and philosophers refused to pay attention
to this theory on the basis that the no-hidden-variables theorems had established that it
couldn’t be correct (one striking example of such a misunderstanding is Wigner (1983,
pp. 53-55)).
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Of course, Bohm’s theory is not a counterexample to these theorems qua mathematical
theorems. It is rather the most striking demonstration of the fact that these mathemati-
cal results do not support the ideological conclusions in defense of which they have been
generally cited. That notwithstanding, it would be premature to dismiss the “no-go the-
orems” as physically and philosophically irrelevant. They capture something not only
about the nature of measurements and the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics
that strikes us as remarkable and contrary to classical intuitions, but also about the
nature of physical objects. The aim of this paper is to work out what exactly these
theorems show and how they support in fact Bohm’s quantum theory, instead of being
an argument against it.
In the next section, we briefly recall the quantum orthodoxy and Bohm’s quantum
theory. Section 3 outlines three of the most important theorems useful for our discussion.
Section 4 rebuts the conclusions that are commonly drawn from them. Section 5 provides
an account of the Bohmian theory of measurements. Section 6 shows how it supports
an ontology of point particles that are characterized by their positions only. Section 7
draws a general conclusion.
2 Quantum orthodoxy and Bohmian mechanics
In the words of David Mermin (1993, p. 803), the scope of the no-hidden-variables
theorems is to defend “a fundamental quantum doctrine”, namely that
(Q) A measurement does not, in general, reveal a preexisting value of the measured
property.
However, accepting this doctrine leads to at least two urgent questions:
1. How do the quantum observables acquire definite values upon measurement?
It is now generally acknowledged that measurements are not a new type of in-
teraction – let alone a primitive metaphysical concept – that requires a special
treatment, but come under the common types of physical interactions (electro-
magnetism, gravitation, etc.). Hence, our physical theories should be able, at least
in principle, to describe them. This, in turn, entails that the notion of measure-
ment must not be part of the axioms of a physical theory. Thus, if quantum theory
implies that the observable values are not merely revealed but produced by the
measurement process – that is, by the interaction between the measurement device
and the measured system –, the theory should tell us how they are produced.
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2. What characterizes a physical system prior to – or better: independent of – mea-
surement?
After all, there must be some sort of ontological underpinning to the measurement
process and the empirical data that it yields. That is, there must be something in
the world on which the measurement is actually performed – something with which
the observer or measurement device interacts –, and there must be something defi-
nite about the physical state of the observer or measurement device that does not,
in turn, require a measurement of the measurement (and so on, ad infinitum).
According to Mermin (1993, p. 803), the orthodox response to question 1 is that “Pre-
cisely how the particular result of an individual measurement is brought into being –
Heisenberg’s ‘transition from the possible to the actual’ – is inherently unknowable”.
The response to 2 seems to be some sort of radical idealism, expressed in his now famous
assertion (and belated response to Einstein) according to which the moon is demonstra-
bly not there when nobody looks (Mermin (1985)). Bohm’s theory entirely rejects this
way of talking. Its presentation as a “hidden variables theory” suggests that it denies
the doctrine Q. However, most contemporary Bohmians actually endorse this doctrine,
and quite emphatically so. Let us briefly recall why this is the case.
For present purposes, we use the formulation of Bohm’s theory that is today known as
Bohmian mechanics (see Dürr et al. (2013); for a discussion of the different contemporary
formulations of Bohm’s theory, see Belousek (2003); Bohm and Hiley (1993) is the latest
elaborate treatment by Bohm himself). Bohmian mechanics can be defined in terms of
the following four principles:
1. Particle configuration: There always is a configuration of N permanent point par-
ticles in the universe that are characterized only by their positions X1, . . . , XN in
three-dimensional, physical space at any time t.
2. Guiding equation: A wave function Ψ is attributed to the particle configuration,
being the central dynamical parameter for its evolution. On the fundamental level,
Ψ is the universal wave function attributed to all the particles in the universe
together. The wave function has the task to determine a velocity field along which
the particles move, given their positions. It accomplishes this task by figuring in
the law of motion of the particles, which is known as the guiding equation:
dXk
dt =
~
mk
Im∇kΨΨ (X1, . . . , XN ). (1)
This equation yields the evolution of the kth particle at a time t as depending on,
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via the wave function, the position of all the other particles at that time.
3. Schrödinger equation: The wave function always evolves according to the Schrödinger
equation:
i~
∂Ψ
∂t
= −
N∑
k=1
~2
2mk
∆kΨ + VΨ (2)
4. Typicality measure: On the basis of the universal wave function Ψ, a unique1
stationary (more precisely: equivariant) typicality measure can be defined in terms
of the |Ψ|2–density. Given that typicality measure, it can then be shown that
for nearly all initial conditions, the distribution of particle configurations in an
ensemble of sub-systems of the universe that admit of a wave function ψ of their
own (known as effective wave function) is a |ψ|2–distribution. A universe in which
this distribution of the particles in sub-configurations obtains is considered to be
in quantum equilibrium.
Assuming that the actual universe is a typical Bohmian universe in that it is in quantum
equilibrium, one can hence deduce Born’s rule for the calculation of measurement out-
come statistics on sub-systems of the universe in Bohmian mechanics (instead of simply
stipulating that rule). In a nutshell, the axiom of |Ψ|2 providing a typicality measure
with Ψ being the universal wave function justifies applying the |ψ|2–rule for the calcula-
tion of the probabilities of measurement outcomes on particular sub-systems within the
universe, with ψ being the effective wave function of the particular systems in question
(see Dürr et al. (2013, ch. 2); cf. section 5 for the notion of effective wave functions).
Thus, the quantum probabilities have in Bohmian mechanics exactly the same status as
the probabilities in classical statistical mechanics: they are derived from a deterministic
law of motion via an appropriate probability measure that is linked with the law. More-
over, if a sub-system admits for an autonomous description in terms of an effective wave
ψ, its complete physical and dynamical state at any time t is given by the pair (Xt, ψt),
where Xt = (X1(t), ..., XM (t)) describes the actual spatial configuration of the system.
Consequently, measurements of observables such as energy, angular momentum, spin,
etc. do not reveal predetermined properties of the particles, because Bohmian mechanics
does not admit them as intrinsic properties of the particles to begin with. Similarly, a
simple analysis of the theory shows that a measurement of the momentum observable
does not, except under special circumstances, measure the instantaneous velocity of a
particle. It is a crucial feature of the theory that the only property of the particles is
their position in space. The particles have a velocity, of course, but velocity is nothing
1See Goldstein and Struyve (2007) for a proof and precise statement.
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else than the change of position in time. The Bohmian velocity is not an observable
(see Dürr et al. (2013, ch. 3.7.2) for a simple proof, but also Wiseman (2007) for the
possibility of weak measurements; see Dürr et al. (2013, ch. 7) for a good discussion of
both results). Velocity is not – in contrast to the Newtonian case – a dynamical degree
of freedom that can be specified independently of the position, because the guiding law
(1) is a first order differential equation, requiring only positions as initial data.
The first and foremost role of the wave function is a dynamical one, namely to yield the
motion of the particles as output, given their positions as input. This explains the name
pilot-wave theory historically given to Bohm’s theory, as if the particles were literally
guided or piloted by a wave in physical space. This way of speaking, however, cannot be
taken literally, since the wave function is defined on configuration space; it is not a wave
propagating in physical space (for the debate about the status of the wave function in
Bohmian mechanics, see Esfeld et al. (2014)). Even in the special case when the wave
function of a subsystem happens to be an eigenstate ψα of a certain observable Aˆ with
eigenvalue α – for instance after an ideal measurement – and it would be safe to say
that “the particle possesses a definite value of A”, this way of speaking is unwarranted.
It should be replaced by the statement that a (repeated) experiment, whose statistics is
encoded in the operator Aˆ, would yield the outcome α with certainty; or simply by the
statement that the effective wave function, guiding the motion of the system, is ψα. In
sum, the validity of doctrine Q is not denied, but substantiated by Bohmian mechanics
on the basis of this theory recognizing only position as a property of the physical system.
3 No-hidden-variables theorems
The basic question that the no-hidden-variables theorems set out to address is whether
the probabilistic nature of the quantum formalism allows for an ignorance interpretation
in the sense that the measured values of quantum observables are in fact predetermined
by additional parameters, whose actual values, in individual runs of an experiment, are
unknown to us, but whose statistical distributions over a series of measurements repro-
duce the observed outcome statistics. In more formal terms, the question is whether
for any relevant family of quantum observables Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ, . . . there exists a correspond-
ing family of random variables ZA, ZB, ZC , . . . on a common probability space Ω such
that the values of these random variables correspond to the possible measurement out-
comes – that is, the eigenvalues of the observable operators. Any ω ∈ Ω would then
be a value of the hypothetical hidden variable(s), determining the measurement val-
ues ZA(ω), ZB(ω), ZC(ω), . . ., and the quantum predictions, for some quantum state ψ,
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would be reproduced by a probability distribution µψ over this hidden variable, such as
〈ψ|Aˆ|ψ〉 = ∫Ω ZA(ω)dµψ(ω), etc.
A no-hidden-variables theorem is thus, in general, a result of the following form (cf.
Dürr et al. (2013, ch. 3)):
There is no “good” map Aˆ 7→ ZA from the set of self-adjoint operators on a
Hilbert space H to random variables on a common probability space Ω such
that the possible values of ZA correspond to the eigenvalues of Aˆ (that is,
the possible measurement values).
The term “good map” is not quite precise, but deliberately so, for it is essentially on
this point – the requirements on the assignment Aˆ 7→ ZA – that the various no-hidden-
variables theorems differ.
3.1 von Neumann
The first no-hidden-variables theorem was proven by von Neumann in his seminal 1932
book Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik (von Neumann (1932), English
translation von Neumann (1955)). In this theorem, a “good” map from observables to
random variables was supposed to be linear, that is, in particular:
Aˆ+ Bˆ 7→ ZA+B = ZA + ZB. (3)
It is easy to see that such a map cannot exist, since for non-commuting operators, the
eigenvalues of their sum are in general not sums of their eigenvalues. Von Neumann’s
linearity assumption was arguably motivated by the additivity of quantum mechanical
expectations values (〈ψ|Aˆ + Bˆ|ψ〉 = 〈ψ|Aˆ|ψ〉 + 〈ψ|Bˆ|ψ〉 holds for all observables Aˆ, Bˆ
and any state ψ), but is nowadays considered as rather naive (Mermin (1993, pp. 805-
806) calls it “silly”). As Mermin (1993, p. 806) points out, requiring (3) “is to ensure
that a relation holds in the mean by imposing it case by case – a sufficient, but hardly
a necessary condition”. In addition, the physical significance of this assumption – in
particular for non-commuting observables that cannot even simultaneously measured –
is rather obscure. If, let’s say, Xˆ is the position and Pˆ the momentum observable, what
is a “measurement of Xˆ + Pˆ” even supposed to mean? For decades, von Neumann’s
impossibility proof was a key element in the defense of the quantum orthodoxy, but it
started to fall apart rather quickly, once people began to study it more systematically.
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3.2 Kochen-Specker
The theorem of Kochen and Specker (1967) was a considerable improvement because it
makes a requirement for the “goodness” of the assignment Aˆ 7→ ZA that seems a priori
much more plausible:
(NC) Whenever the quantum mechanical joint distribution of a set of self-
adjoint operators (A1, . . . , Am) exists, that is, when they form a commuting
family, the joint distribution of the corresponding set of random variables,
that is, of (ZA1 , . . . , ZAm), must agree with the quantum mechanical joint
distribution.
This assumption actually implies that all algebraic identities which hold between the
observable operators must also hold between the random variables,2 but the condition
is now only imposed on families of commuting observables that can be jointly measured.
Families of commuting observables always have a common probability distribution (as
random variables on a classical probability space). So what could possibly go wrong?
One can consider an observable Aˆ once as part of a commuting family (Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ, . . .)
and once as part of a commuting family (Aˆ, Lˆ, Mˆ , . . .) such that Bˆ, Cˆ, . . . and Lˆ, Mˆ , . . .
are incompatible – that is, non-commuting – with each other. Assumption (NC) would
be trivial if the observable Aˆ could be associated with a random variable ZA, as part
of the family (ZA, ZB, ZC , ...), and another random variable Z˜A as part of the family
(Z˜A, ZL, ZM , ...). The considered hidden-variables-schemes presuppose, however, a rigid
assignment Aˆ 7→ ZA, independent of the measurement context. In other words, ZA must
be the same, whether Aˆ is measured together with Bˆ, Cˆ, . . . or together with Lˆ, Mˆ , . . ..
The crucial assumption underlying the no-go theorem of Kochen and Specker (1967) has
thus been named non-contextuality. The upshot is that non-contextual hidden variables
are incompatible with the predictions of quantum mechanics.
A particularly nice and simple proof is due to Mermin (1993, p. 810). It consists in
the following arrangement of 3× 3 observables on a 4-dimensional Hilbert space:
σ1x σ
2
x σ
1
xσ
2
x
σ2y σ
1
y σ
1
yσ
2
y
σ1xσ
2
y σ
2
xσ
1
y σ
1
zσ
2
z
2E.g. if Aˆ · Bˆ = Bˆ · Aˆ = Cˆ, it means that the joint distribution is zero on the value set {(c 6= ab) |
a, b, c eigenvalues of Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ} and hence ZA · ZB = ZC almost surely.
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Using the standard commutation relations of the Pauli-matrices (“spin observables”)
and the fact that the possible eigenvalues are ±1, it is easy to verify that:
(a) The observables in each of the three rows and each of the three columns are mutually
commuting.
(b) The product of the three observables in each of the three rows is 1.
(c) The product of the three observables in first two columns is 1, while the product of
the right column is −1.
Thus, no consistent assignment of predetermined values to the nine observables is pos-
sible, since identity (b) would require the product of all nine values to be +1, while (c)
would require it to be −1. This proves the Kochen-Specker theorem.
3.3 Bell
One of the more tragic chapters in the history of quantum mechanics is that for many
defenders of the supposed orthodoxy, Bell’s theorem (reprinted in Bell (2004, ch. 2))
has replaced von Neumann’s as the mathematical result that finally spells the dead
for any “completion” of the quantum formalism. Certainly, the physical significance
of Bell’s theorem can hardly be overstated, but to understand it as just another no-
hidden-variables argument is to miss the point entirely. Bell himself has addressed the
misunderstanding on various occasions, for instance:
My own first paper on this subject (Physics 1, 195 (1965)) starts with a sum-
mary of the EPR argument from locality to deterministic hidden variables.
But the commentators have almost universally reported that it begins with
deterministic hidden variables. (Bell (2004, p. 157))
The point of Bell’s theorem is not hidden variables but nonlocality (see Maudlin (2014)
for an excellent discussion). Bell’s analysis starts from the EPR argument that assumes
locality and concludes that the quantum formalism must be incomplete. EPR did indeed
attack the quantum doctrine that observables do not have predetermined values prior
to measurement. In brief, they did so by noticing that, when considering two entangled
systems A and B, certain observable values of A can be determined by measurements on
the distant system B (and vice versa). But this would presuppose some sort of nonlocal
influence unless these values were actually predetermined, prior to the measurement on
the distant system, by hidden variables (and thus only revealed rather than determined
by our interaction with the distant system).
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Three decades later, Bell proved that even by introducing additional variables, the
statistical predictions of quantum mechanics cannot be reproduced without nonlocal
influences. The conclusion is thus that quantum mechanics is nonlocal, no matter what.
And since a substantial amount of experimental evidence confirms the predictions of
quantum mechanics, the conclusion is that any correct theory of nature is nonlocal, no
matter what. Nonlocality, in other words, is not the price that we pay for introducing
hidden variables. Hidden variables were Einstein’s hope for avoiding the nonlocality of
standard quantum mechanics, and Bell proved that this hope cannot be realized because
nonlocality is a fact of nature. Hence, using nonlocality as an argument against Bohmian
mechanics, or so-called ”hidden variables theories” in general, get’s the issue completely
wrong. Quantum mechanics is nonlocal, and any extension of – or alternative to –
quantum mechanics better be nonlocal as well; otherwise, it is demonstrably wrong.
4 The message of the quantum
So, what is the upshot of the no-hidden-variables theorems? In this section, we consider
some common responses and briefly indicate why they are wrong-headed.
4.1 Completeness of quantum mechanics
The no-hidden-variables theorems are usually cited in support of the claim that standard
quantum mechanics is “complete”, that is, in particular, that the wave function or
quantum state – with its role in determining the probabilities of measurement outcomes
– represents the complete physical state of a quantum system. However, when used in
this context, the traditional hidden variables program seems to commit the following
mistake that Einstein warned the young Heisenberg about:
I suspect that you will run into problems at exactly that part of your theory
that we just talked about ... You pretend that you could leave everything as
it is on the side of observations, that is, that you could just talk in the former
language about what physicists observe. (Quoted after Heisenberg (2012, p.
89); translation by the authors.)
Indeed, the idea that physical observations must be reported in “classical language”
(while the same language is unable to provide an objective description of the micro-
cosm) became one of the core tenants of the so-called Copenhagen interpretation. This
included the (at least tacit) assumption that the relevant observables of quantum physics
are just the familiar properties known from Newtonian mechanics, or at least that the
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physical and ontological status of the properties, once measured, is the same as had
been generally assumed in classical physics, namely that the observables refer to intrin-
sic properties of the physical systems. The no-hidden-variables theorems then show that
the intrinsic properties of physical systems, insofar as they are captured by observables,
cannot have predetermined values (unless one buys into undesirable consequences such as
“contextuality” that seem to defeat the purpose of assuming predetermined properties.)
However, this – orthodox – way of reading the no-hidden-variables theorems directly
runs into the two questions raised in section 2: How do the quantum observables acquire
definite values upon measurement? What characterizes a physical system prior to –
or better: independent of – measurement? The “industry of no-go theorems” (Laudisa
(2014)) drives us towards the negative conclusion of no predetermined values, but it does
not provide an answer to these questions. Instead of this reading of no predetermined
values of intrinsic properties of physical systems, there also is another, arguably more
radical reading of the no-hidden-variables theorems possible: they tell us that observ-
ables do not correspond to properties of physical systems at all, so that the question
of predetermined values of such properties does not even arise. This is the Bohmian
reading, which then does provide an answer to these questions.
4.2 Metaphysical indeterminacy
Following the lead of mainstream physics, the philosophical literature has recently de-
veloped a renewed interest in the concept of metaphysical indeterminacy, which is in-
tended in this context to capture the idea that the values of quantum observables, prior
to measurement, are not merely unknown but, in a metaphysically robust sense, un-
specified. According to Calosi and Wilson (2017), properties of quantum systems are
metaphysically indeterminate in the sense that they have a determinable property with-
out a unique corresponding determinate. Thus, an electron, for instance, possesses a
determinable property “spin”, but its value is indeterminate until we actually measure
it.
In contrast, and arguing against the concept of metaphysical indeterminacy, Glick
(2017, p. 207) proposes what he calls a “sparse view” of standard quantum mechanics:
Sparse view: when the quantum state of A is not in an eigenstate of Oˆ, it
lacks both the determinate and determinable properties associated with Oˆ.
Obviously, none of these views does anything to address the measurement problem, that
is, to clarify how a measurement turns an indeterminate – or non-existent – property of a
physical system into a determinate one. And while this is not the issue of this particular
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philosophical discussion, it certainly is dubious to base metaphysics on imprecise or even
inconsistent physics.
Bohmian mechanics, by contrast, shows that there is no work to do for a concept
of metaphysical indeterminacy: the state of a physical system is completely and pre-
cisely determined, at any moment in time, by the actual particle positions and the wave
function, fixing how the positions change in time. Furthermore, this theory supports a
metaphysical view that is even sparser than the one advocated by Glick: Neither the de-
terminate nor the determinable property associated with an observable Oˆ is part of the
ontology, independent of whether or not the quantum state of a system is an eigenstate
or not. The only property that particles have – and need – is a position in physical space
(see Esfeld and Deckert (2017) for an elaboration on a sparse ontology in that sense).
4.3 Quantum logic
One of the more audacious claims in support of which the no-hidden-variables theorems
are employed is that quantum mechanics compels us to give up classical logic in favor
of a new quantum logic. It is easy to see where this idea comes from. If we consider the
simple example of spin (for a spin-1/2-particle, to be discussed in detail in section 5) it
is tempting to assign to the proposition
q ∨ ¬q: The particle has z-spin up or z-spin down
the truth-value true. However, according to the doctrine Q, neither
q: The particle has z-spin up
nor
¬q: The particle has z-spin down
can be considered true prior to a measurement or unless the particle happens to be in a
z-spin eigenstate.
Since Quine’s seminal paper “Two dogmas of empiricism” (Quine (1951)), it is widely
accepted in philosophy that not even a revision of the rules of logic is out of bounds
when adjusting a theoretical system to new empirical evidence, though they are the last
knob to turn. In that vein, the first and most important objection to quantum logic (as
a proposal for the “true” logic of the physical world) is not that it is a priori absurd, but
that it is hardly justified by theoretical or explanatory merits. Giving up on classical
logic does nothing to address the two crucial questions formulated in section 2. The var-
ious proposed systems of “quantum logic” are merely modeled on the standard theory
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and thus inherit all its problems – including the measurement problem. In particular,
changing a logical formalism does not elucidate the ontology of quantum mechanics, nor
does it provide for a physical account of when and why propositions involving quantum
observables acquire definitive truth values. Conversely, the example of Bohmian me-
chanics shows that once we have a clear ontology, and take the measurement process
seriously as part of the theory, no departure from classical logic is called for.
5 Measurements in Bohmian mechanics: Spin
In this section, we explain how Bohmian mechanics treats measurement experiments,
how this treatment supports doctrine Q and what the consequences for the status of
observables are.
5.1 The Bohmian treatment of the measurement process
The solution to the measurement problem offered by Bohmian mechanics comes from
a simple idea: to describe quantum mechanically also the experimental devices, since
macroscopic objects are composed of microscopic objects. Thus, to describe experimental
situations in Bohmian mechanics, we split the total configuration (of, in the last resort,
the entire universe) into (X,Y ) ∈ R3M × R3(N−M) where the former variable refers to
the particle configuration of the investigated M -particle sub-system and the latter to
the configuration of the environment, which includes the particles of the measurement
device registering the outcomes in “pointer positions”. Fundamentally, in the Bohmian
theory, there is only one wave function, the universal wave function Ψ = Ψ(x, y), guiding
all the particles together (the lower case variables refer to the possible configurations – Ψ
is a function on the entire configuration space – in contrast to the actual configurations
denoted by upper case letters). However, by inserting the actual configuration of the
environment at time t, we get a conditional wave function, which is a function of the
degrees of freedom of the sub-system only:
ψt(x) := Ψt(x, Yt). (4)
This conditional wave function is always well-defined but not very useful in practice,
since it has a non-trivial dependence on the exact configuration of the environment.
However, in some situations, when the universal wave function takes the form
Ψ(x, y) = ψ(x)Φ(y) + Ψ⊥(x, y) (5)
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where Φ(y) and Ψ⊥(x, y) have macroscopically disjoint support in the y-variables and
Yt ∈ supp Φ(y), i.e. Ψ⊥(x, Yt) = 0 ∀x, we can for all practical purposes forget about the
“empty” wave Ψ⊥ and provide an autonomous description of the subsystem in terms
of the effective wave function ψ, which is the Bohmian analog to the usual wave func-
tion used in textbook quantum mechanics. Now, let’s consider an ideal measurement
associated with an “observable” with eigenvalues α1, . . . , αn and corresponding eigen-
states ϕ1, . . . , ϕn. In general, ψ will be a superposition ψ =
n∑
i=1
ciϕi, ci ∈ C. Under the
Schrödinger evolution – after the subsystem has coupled to the measurement device in
the course of the measurement process –, the state of system + environment (ignoring
again the empty part of the wave function Ψ⊥) will thus have the form
Ψ(x, y) =
n∑
i=1
ciϕi(x)Φi(y) (6)
where the environment states Φi are concentrated, in particular, on different pointer
configurations, indicating the measurement outcomes αi, and have therefore pairwise
disjoint supports in configuration space. Note that it is only for simplicity that we don’t
distinguish between the degrees of freedom of the measurement device and the rest of
the universe, subsuming both in the “environment” (y-system). However, the actual
configuration Y of the universe (pointer) will lie inside only one of the branches, let’s
say Y ∈ supp Φk. Hence, the actual pointer configuration will indicate the measure-
ment outcome αk and the new effective (=conditional) wave function of the subsystem
becomes ψY (x) = ckϕk(x)Φk(Y ) =ˆ ϕk after normalization. Hence, while the universal
wave function always evolves according to the linear Schrödinger equation, the effective
wave function automatically collapses into the eigenstate corresponding to the registered
measurement result (for a detailed exposition see Dürr and Teufel (2009, ch. 9)).
This account has notably the following five features:
1. There never are superpositions of anything in physical space. All there is in
physical space are particle configurations with always definite positions. Thus,
Schrödinger’s cat always is in a configuration of either a live cat or a dead cat.
Superpositions concern only the wave function in physical space in its role to de-
termine the trajectories on which the particles move.
2. Consequently, quantum logic is irrelevant when it comes to an account of mea-
surement: the particle configuration belongs unambiguously to one of the possible
supports of the wave function, which in turn correspond to macroscopically dif-
ferent components of the experimental device, determining in this way the final
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outcome of the observation at hand.
3. Nevertheless, there is entanglement in physical space: the motion of any particle
depends on, strictly speaking, the positions of all the other particles in the universe
via the wave function. Thus, for instance, in the double slit experiment, the
motion of any particle after having passed one slit depends on the position of all
the particles making up the experimental set-up, in particular on whether or not
the other slit is open. This is the way in which Bohmian mechanics implements
the quantum nonlocality proven by Bell’s theorem. The consequence is that the
trajectories of the particles often are highly non-classical.
4. A measurement is an interaction that will in general change the wave function
of the measured system. “Incompatible measurements” – corresponding to non-
commuting observables – are simply experiments in which the first measurement
interaction changes the wave function in a way that influences the statistics of the
second, etc.
5. The fact that we cannot go beyond Born’s rule in making predictions is explained
not by any indeterminacy of the properties of the particles, or any indeterminism
of the dynamics, but by the fact that we cannot have more precise knowledge of the
initial particle configuration. As mentioned in section 2, in Bohmian mechanics,
Born’s rule is derived from the laws of motion plus a probability (more precisely:
typicality) measure linked with these laws.
Once “measurements” and “observations” are no longer treated as primitive but as phys-
ical processes, to be analyzed on the basis of a precise microscopic theory, it turns out
that the quantum orthodoxy was right about the fact that measurements do not re-
veal preexisting values of observables, but wrong about the idea that these observables
correspond to properties of physical systems. The important contrast between classi-
cal and quantum mechanics that the no-hidden-variables theorems reveal is thus not
that quantum phenomena are irreducibly random, but rather that quantum phenomena
are at odds with a metaphysics of intrinsic properties that classical mechanics did not
necessitate but indulge.
5.2 What is measured in a spin measurement?
Let us now discuss a Stern-Gerlach spin measurement, as the simplest but maybe most
instructive example of a measurement process in Bohmian mechanics. In this famous ex-
periment, a spin-1/2-particle (originally a silver atom) is sent through an inhomogeneous
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magnetic field (Stern-Gerlach magnet) and then registered on a detector screen, where
one observes a deviation perpendicular to the flight direction and parallel or anti-parallel
to the gradient of the magnetic field.
To describe the experiment theoretically, we consider the propagation of a concen-
trated wave packet
Φ0 = ϕ0(z)
(
α
(
1
0
)
+ β
(
0
1
))
(7)
through an inhomogeneous magnetic field with gradient in z-direction. We ignore the
components of the wave-function in the x, y-directions and the spatial spreading of the
wave function, assuming that the flight time is reasonably short. A straightforward
computation using the Pauli equation (which is the non-relativistic limit of the Dirac
equation, describing the time evolution of a spinor-valued wave function in an exter-
nal electromagnetic field) then shows that the equations for the two spin-components
decouple and that each acquires a phase
Φ(n)(τ) = exp[i(−1)n+1µbτ
~
z] Φ(n)0 ,
where τ is the time spent in the magnetic field, corresponding to a group velocity of
vz = (−1)n+1µbτ
m
.
The inhomogeneous magnetic field thus leads to a spatial separation of the wave packets,
corresponding to the spin-components: The wave packet Φ(1)(t) = αϕ1(t, z)
(1
0
)
propa-
gates in the positive z-direction (in the direction of the gradient of the magnetic field)
and the wave packet Φ(2)(t) = βϕ2(t, z)
(0
1
)
in the negative z-direction. Assuming that
the two wave packets remain reasonably well localized, they will have approximately
disjoint supports after a little while, that is, Φ(1) is concentrated above the symmetry
axis and Φ(2) below. It is important to emphasize that this is purely a result of the
Schrödinger (respectively Pauli) time evolution, which is part of every quantum theory,
independent of interpretative issues.
However, in Bohmian mechanics (and only there) it now makes sense to ask whether
the particle moves upwards – guided by the wave packet Φ(1) – or downwards, guided
by the wave packet Φ(2). In the first case, it would hit a detector screen above the
symmetry axis and one says that “the particle has z-spin up”; in the second case, it
would hit a detector screen below the symmetry axis and one says that “the particle has
z-spin down”. But this is a rather unfortunate way of speaking. Spin is not a property
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that the particle possesses over and above its position. To “have” spin up or spin down
means nothing more and nothing less than to be guided by the part of the wave function
that corresponds to the upper or lower spinor-component (in the z-spin basis) – that
is, to move, in the pertinent measurement context, in the respective way. In other
words: spin is a degree of freedom of the wave function (related to its transformation
under rotations) that manifests itself, under certain circumstances, in a particular kind
of particle motion. As such, it belongs to the dynamical structure of the theory, not to
the ontology of objects in physical space (see also Bell (2004, ch. 4) and Norsen (2014)).
According to Born’s rule for the particle positions, we can compute the probability of
finding the particle with “spin up”, that is, in the support of Φ(1), or “spin down”, that
is, in the support of Φ(2) as:
P(“z-spin up”) = P(X ∈ supp Φ(1)) =
∫
supp Φ(1)
|Φ(1)(t, z)|2dz = |α|2
P(“z-spin down”) = P(X ∈ supp Φ(2)) =
∫
supp Φ(2)
|Φ(2)(t, z)|2dz = |β|2
(8)
Obviously, these probabilities can already be computed from the initial state, using the
projections on the respective spin-components:
P(“z-spin up”) = 〈Φ0| ↑〉〈↑ |Φ0〉 = |α|2
P(“z-spin down”) = 〈Φ0| ↓〉〈↓ |Φ0〉 = |β|2.
(9)
Finally, assigning to “spin up” and “spin down” the numerical values ±~2 , the expectation
value is computed as
~
2 〈Φ0|
(
|↑〉〈↑| − |↓〉〈↓|
)
|Φ0〉 = ~2 〈Φ0|σz|Φ0〉. (10)
In standard quantum mechanics, the operator ~2σz has developed a certain life of its
own as the “spin observable”. The Bohmian analysis reveals it to be nothing more and
nothing less than a convenient book-keeper of the measurement statistics (for a general
discussion of observables and operators in Bohmian mechanics, see Dürr et al. (2013,
ch. 3)). We should note that the example of spin is particular in Bohmian mechanics
in that the statistical analysis does not require the coupling to a measurement device.
It makes sense to ask whether the particle moves upwards or downwards after passing
the Stern-Gerlach magnet, without considering a screen or detector in which its position
is finally recorded. In many cases, though, the “observable values” have meaning only
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insofar as their are registered in some sort of “pointer” configuration.
It is interesting to observe that all precise formulations of quantum mechanics, which
solve the measurement problem, agree on this basic point that the measured values
are produced rather than revealed by the interaction between system and measurement
device. According to spontaneous collapse theories (such as GRW), it is the Stern-
Gerlach magnet that causes the wave packets to separate and the subsequent coupling
to a detector (screen) that (very very likely) causes a collapse and forces the system to
go into one of the possible outcomes. According to the more sophisticated versions of
Many-Worlds, it is the splitting of the wave packets in the Stern-Gerlach magnet and the
subsequent interaction with a detector that leads to decoherence and a branching into
“worlds”, in which the detector has registered “spin up” and “spin down” respectively.
Only in Bohmian mechanics, however, a unique measurement outcome is determined
by the initial position of the particle and the deterministic law of motion. (Collapse
theories are fundamentally stochastic, while in many-worlds theories, measurements do
not have unique outcomes.) That notwithstanding, it would be misleading to say that
the particle possesses a predetermined spin, irrespective of the measurement context. In
particular, what we end up calling the “spin value” is a number that encodes the result
of the measurement interaction – how the particle moves after passing the magnetic field
– by contrast to an additional physical quantity that determines it.
5.3 Is Bohmian mechanics “contextual”?
In fact, this confusion between “predetermined outcomes” and “predetermined prop-
erties” is all there is to the discussion of contextuality in Bohmian mechanics. What
this theory rejects is the “naive realism about operators” or observables (Daumer et al.
(1996)) – these unholy and categorically confused amalgams of self-adjoint operators,
physical properties, and observed data points. As mentioned before, observables play
no fundamental role in the theory; they merely arise, in a statistical analysis, as book-
keepers of outcome statistics. Consequently, they are not properties of anything. It is
simply wrong, and giving rise to further confusion, to call them “contextual properties”
of physical systems. In fact, different experimental setups associated with the same “ob-
servable” may have nothing in common besides the fact that they are associated with
the same statistical book-keeping operator.
To illustrate this point, let’s return to Mermin’s proof of the Kochen-Specker theorem
(see section 3.2) and focus, for instance, on the observable σ1xσ2x in the upper right corner
of his scheme. This observable can be trivially measured together with σ1x and σ2x: Take
two spin-1/2-particles and measure their x-spin separately in the way described above.
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Assign the value +1 if the particle moves in positive x-direction and −1 if the particle
moves in negative x-direction and compute the product of the outcome values to obtain
“the value of σ1xσ2x”. But how to measure σ1xσ2x together with σ1yσ2y and σ1zσ2z? We
have no idea, actually. In any case, one cannot simply measure the x-spin of particle
1 and 2 separately, as before, since this would preclude the simultaneous measurement
of σ1yσ2y and σ1zσ2z . Hence, whatever an experimentalist would have to do to perform a
joint measurement of (σ1xσ2x, σ1yσ2y , σ1zσ2z) – and whatever the physical significance of this
measurement might be – it certainly requires a completely different experiment than the
measurement of (σ1x, σ2x, σ1xσ2x).
In Bohmian mechanics, the initial state (wave-function + positions) of the particles
(possibly together with the initial state of the experimental setup) would determine the
outcome of “the σ1xσ2x-measurement” in both experiments, but there is simply no reason
why these outcomes must in every case agree. A disagreement would be troubling only
if one assumed that the particles actually have a preexisting σ1xσ2x-property that both
experiments are supposed to reveal by different methods. But this is just not the case
in Bohmian mechanics. And taking the physical situation seriously, there is no reason
why it should be the case in any reasonable theory. As Goldstein (2017) notes: “If
we avoid naive realism about operators, contextuality amounts to little more than the
rather unremarkable observation that results of experiments should depend upon how
they are performed ...”.
5.4 Why measurements?
Nonetheless, since, according to Bohmian mechanics, the outcome of any measurement
is determined by the initial state of the system (or at least of system + apparatus), the
measurement outcome does reveal a certain amount of information about the state of the
system prior to measurement. In fact, in some cases, the Bohmian theory allows us to
infer significantly more information about the measured system than standard quantum
mechanics does. If we consider, for instance, a z-spin measurement on a particle in the
spin state 1√2(| ↑z〉+ | ↓z〉) and assume that the setup is reasonably symmetric about the
incident axis, we can infer from the “no-crossing property” of Bohmian trajectories that
if a particle hits the screen above/below the symmetry axis (corresponding to z-spin
up or z-spin down, respectively), it’s initial position must have been above/below the
symmetry axis as well.
In general, though, a quantum experiment provides more information about the state
of the system after the measurement process. In particular, if we perform an ideal
(projective) measurement and find a non-degenerate eigenvalue α of some observable Aˆ,
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we know that the effective quantum state of the system after the measurement is the
corresponding eigenstate ψα. According to Bohmian mechanics, this quantum state is an
objective physical degree of freedom of the system (in accordance with the PBR-theorem
(Pusey et al., 2012)), providing statistical information about the particle configuration
and determining its state of motion. It is thus highly informative about the future
behavior of the system. Note, however, that it would be wrongheaded to interpret the
effective quantum state as an additional intrinsic property of the particles, a) because
one can, in general, assign a wave function only to the subsystem as a whole but not to
each particle individually (non-separability) and b) because the effective wave function
depends – implicitly – on the universal wave function and the configuration of all the
other particles in the universe (cf. equations (4) and (5)).
Orthodox quantum mechanics agrees that a measurement provides, in general, more
information about the post-measurement state of the system, but would, strictly speak-
ing, disagree on what the information is actually about. The disagreement can be
summarized as follows: According to Bohmian mechanics, the “observable values” are
best understood as encoding information about the quantum state (i.e. the dynamical
state) of the system, while according to standard quantum mechanics (or at least most
versions thereof), the quantum state is understood as encoding information about the
observable values. What makes the Bohmian view more coherent is the fact that the
observable values per se – in contrast to the quantum state – have no causal role within
the theory.3 To appreciate this point, it might be helpful to engage in a little thought ex-
ercise: Suppose we write down some abstract self-adjoint operator Aˆ on a Hilbert space
and tell you that a certain physical system (an electron, let’s say) has the value α of
this “observable”. What information have we actually given you about the world? How
would you (or any other physical system) have to interact with the electron to “notice”
that it has the Aˆ-value α rather than α′? Try to answer these questions by taking the
physical theory seriously, whatever you consider quantum theory to be.
6 Are observables observable?
The suggestive but misleading terminology of “measuring an observable” has not only
lead to a naive realism, but also to a naive empiricism about observables in quantum
mechanics. It is usually taken for granted that all empirical data underlying quantum
physics consist in measured values of observables, represented by – or corresponding to
– self-adjoint operators. Against this backdrop, our previous analysis seems to lead to a
3Except maybe for conserved quantities, but even those get their physical significance mostly in the
“classical limit”.
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certain dilemma. Since the measured values of quantum observables are emergent in a
measurement process, they must emerge from an underlying ontology that is not itself
characterized in terms of definite values of quantum observables. This seems to leave us
with two possible options:
1. The physical properties are not observable.
2. The physical properties are a small subset of the observables (small enough to
avoid the no-hidden-variables results).
Both options invite criticism. In the first case, the underlying ontology would have no di-
rect empirical basis. The second option is open to the charge of arbitrariness, as it seems
to reify some observable properties but not others that have the same empirical status.
In fact, both lines of attack are occasionally used against Bohmian mechanics, the first
in form of the claim that “the Bohmian trajectories cannot be observed”, the second in
form of the question “why take the position as your ‘hidden variable’ and not something
else?”. While some interesting remarks could be made in response to these objections,
we want to take a step back and question the basic assumption that the “observables”
are somehow a priori given as fundamental objects of empirical observation.
Consider the following image (Fig. 1) from an original Stern-Gerlach experiment,
reported as the first experimental observation of a “quantized direction (Richtungsquan-
telung)” of the angular momentum / magnetic moment of atoms in an external magnetic
field (Gerlach and Stern, 1922). Should we say that what was actually observed in this
experiment – what the empirical data consists in – is the particles’ spin?
Evidently, our more immediate observation is that of dark marks on a screen, the “non-
classical two-valuedness” being manifested in the distinct separation of the arcs on both
sides of the symmetry axis, when the magnetic field is turned on. And evidently, the
statistics of “spin up” and “spin down” (deviation to the right / left) alone are too
coarse-grained to capture all observable details of the pattern.
But this now puts the orthodox view in a predicament. Either quantum mechanics
could describe the experiment, in more detail, as series of position measurements (the
points of impact of the atoms building up the pattern on the screen); then the spin ob-
servable is redundant or, at least, derivative upon the observable “position”. Or standard
quantum mechanics somehow compels us to describe this experiment as a measurement
of “spin”. Then the theory is empirically incomplete, since it cannot – even statistically
and in principle – account for all observable details of the experimental outcome.
In general, all that we observe are the positions of discrete objects and the change
of these positions. Of course, there is more to these discrete objects than their mere
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Figure 1: Pattern created by a ray of silver atomes in the original Stern-Gerlach experi-
ment: left without, right with magnetic field.
positions, that is, spatial relationships and change of these relationships. They notably
have different colors, which makes it possible to discern them in perception. But color
perception is not an observable that figures in any physical theory, and the quantum
observables do not help us to come up with an account of color perception. In electro-
magnetism, “colors” are identified with certain wavelengths in the electromagnetic field.
But the electromagnetic field should be first and foremost understood in terms of its
role for the motion of particles (and be it particles in our visual receptors). In other
words, we do not observe fields, but only certain patterns of motion that we explain and
calculate in terms of fields (cf. Lazarovici (2018)). For classical electrodynamics, even
a field free formulation is available, namely the one of Wheeler and Feynman (1945),
which may have a number of drawbacks, but certainly does not fail for the reason that it
denies alleged field observations. By the same token, even in the case of the gravitational
waves detected by LIGO in 2016, all the evidence is evidence of change in the relative
positions of particles, which is then mathematically described in terms of a wave rippling
through the gravitational field.
Bell (2004, p. 166) considered it to be the first and foremost lesson of Bohmian
mechanics that
in physics the only observations we must consider are position observations,
if only the positions of instrument pointers. It is a great merit of the de
Broglie–Bohm picture to force us to consider this fact. If you make axioms,
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rather than definitions and theorems, about the ‘measurement’ of anything
else, then you commit redundancy and risk inconsistency.
This crucial point applies to the whole of physics. Also in classical mechanics, we do
not observe mass when we observe gravitational attraction, and we do not literally see
angular momentum when we notice the regular motion of the moon around the earth.
What we observe is just that: certain regularities in the motion of matter, which are
captured by the dynamical structure of the theory.
Hence, even in classical physics, quantities like energy, momentum, angular momen-
tum, etc. get their meaning and relevance from what they tell us about the way matter
moves. The same applies also to the classical parameters of mass and charge. Ernst
Mach (1919, p. 241) highlighted this issue when he emphasized in his comment on
Newton’s Principia that “The true definition of mass can be deduced only from the
dynamical relations of bodies”. In Bohmian mechanics, then, the way matter moves is
encoded in the wave function, making all additional properties unnecessary or redun-
dant. (Mass and charge, as well, are best understood as situated on the level of the
wave function, instead of being intrinsic properties of the particles, see most recently
Pylkkänen et al. (2015) and Esfeld et al. (2017).) This is the basic reason why Bohmian
mechanics endorses doctrine Q. In that respect, the lesson of the no-hidden-variables
theorems is that in quantum mechanics, one cannot treat the observables as properties
of the physical systems, whereas in classical mechanics, one does not run into a problem
with the physics if one regards quantities like energy, momentum, angular momentum,
etc. as properties of the physical systems (although there is no cogent reason to do so
in classical physics either).
Any quantum theory that admits what is known as a primitive ontology of matter in
physical space privileges position – be it the position of permanent particles as in the
Bohm theory, be it the value of the density of matter at the points of physical space
as in the GRWm theory, be it single events (flashes) occurring at some points of space
as in the GRWf theory (see Allori et al. (2008)). In all these theories, the quantum
observables are construed on the basis of the positions of objects, namely in terms of
how these positions behave in certain experimental contexts. Also in the many worlds
theory, which does not recognize a primitive ontology of matter in physical space, but
proposes an ontology in terms of the universal wave function, position is privileged: it is
the position basis in which the wave function decoheres, splitting into different branches,
which constitute “many worlds” on this view.
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7 Conclusion
What we perceive with the naked eye are the positions of macroscopic objects. But we
know from scientific experience that the macroscopic objects are composed of discrete
microscopic objects. If the macroscopic objects have precise positions when we observe
them, so do the microscopic objects. There is no coherent theory of a magic power
of the mind to change macroscopic objects in such a way that they acquire positions
only when a being with a mind perceives them. So the macroscopic objects better
have positions independently of someone observing them. If not the moon, so surely
the desk in my office is there also when I do not observe it. But then it follows that
also the microscopic objects that compose these macroscopic objects do have positions
independently of them being observed. Again, there is no coherent theory according to
which there is something special about the microscopic objects that compose my desk
and the like. So the conclusion is that the microscopic objects tout court have a position
independently of them being observed.
Bohmian mechanics shows how to build a quantum theory on this simple and obvious
reasoning. Superpositions then concern only the parameter that encodes the dynamics
of the particles, namely the wave function, but not the particles themselves. This in-
sight is the key to answering the two questions raised at the beginning of this paper
and to avoid all the puzzles of standard quantum mechanics, such as notably the mea-
surement problem. However, as it is trivial that physical objects have positions, so it
is trivial that in order to access these positions, we have to interact with these objects
and thereby change their positions. Generally speaking, for one particle configuration,
say a macroscopic object, to contain information about the positions of other particles,
there must be a correlation between them, which is, furthermore, reliable in the sense of
being reproducible. This applies in particular to correlations between particle configura-
tions in human brains and particles outside the brains, assuming that all the perceptual
knowledge that persons acquire passes through their brains.
Hence, for reasons stemming from the very way in which we acquire knowledge about
the natural world, a limited accessibility of physical objects is to be expected. In that
sense, classical mechanics is an idealization, and quantum mechanics brings out that
limitation on our knowledge. In Bohmian mechanics, this is done in the theorem of
“absolute uncertainty” (Dürr et al. (2013, ch. 2)), stating that we cannot have more in-
formation about the actual particle configuration of a sub-system than what is provided
by the |ψ|2-distribution in terms of its effective wave function. That notwithstanding,
there is, of course, no question of an a priori deduction of this theorem – or the Heisen-
berg uncertainty relations – from general conditions of our knowledge. It is just that
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some principled limit on our knowledge of particular matters of fact – such as initial
conditions of physical systems – is to be expected.
If the evolution of the physical systems is highly sensitive to slight variations in their
initial conditions, as is the case with quantum systems, it then follows that in general
we can only make statistical predictions about the behavior of ensembles of physical
systems prepared under the same conditions, but not predictions about the evolution
of an individual system, although the laws of motion that govern the evolution of these
systems can be fully deterministic (cf. Oldofredi et al. (2016)). Again, classical mechan-
ics is deceptively generous in this respect, and quantum mechanics brings out a fact that
turns out to be trivial upon reflection (and actually comes out already in classical statis-
tical mechanics): deterministic laws require a probability measure to yield predictions,
which then are statistical. However, all these are facts about epistemology, the theory
of knowledge – as the word “uncertainty relations” clearly brings out –, and not about
ontology, that is, about what there is in the world.
Nonetheless, the no-hidden-variables theorems have a great merit: they tell us that
a sparse ontology of positions is not just good metaphysics, but strongly suggested by
our best theory of physics. In classical mechanics, one can attribute dynamical param-
eters and all sorts of “observables”, which are functions of the particle positions and
momenta, as intrinsic properties to the particles. This does not lead to conflict with the
phenomena because the active role of the measurement process – both in producing the
data and in changing the state of the measured system – can be usually neglected in
the classical regime. In quantum mechanics, as we have seen, the situation is markedly
different. The moral then is of course not that there is nothing if one cannot go from
observables to ontology, but that one has to start with conceiving a – provisional, hypo-
thetical – ontology for whose evolution the dynamical parameters then are formulated.
The guideline for this is the experimental evidence together with the coherence and
explanatory fruitfulness of the proposed ontology. Bohmian mechanics shows how the
simplest suggestion in that respect – the evidence of discrete objects and their composi-
tion by discrete microobjects suggesting to try out a particle ontology – can go through
also in the quantum case and yield all the explanations that one can reasonably demand.
In a nutshell, the lesson of the no-hidden-variables theorems is that it is position only
when it comes to the ontology of the physical world, and Bohmian mechanics teaches us
how to do physics on that basis (see Esfeld and Deckert (2017) for a general treatment
of that insight from classical mechanics to QFT). Note that this is not about classical
vs. quantum. The ontology neither is classical nor quantum. The dynamics may be
classical (as in local field theories) or quantum. What a quantum dynamics has to be
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subsequent to Bell’s theorem is clearly brought out by the nonlocality implemented in
the Bohm theory. There is no a priori explanation of why the dynamics of the world is
nonlocal. But this nonlocality fundamentally deviates from the ideas that drive classical
field theory, showing a profound interconnectedness (holism) of the things in the universe.
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